Data security and privacy is an important but challenging problem in cloud computing. One of the security concerns from cloud users is how to efficiently verify the integrity of their data stored on the cloud server. Third Party Auditing (TPA) is a new technique proposed in recent years to achieve this goal. In a recent paper (IEEE Transactions on Computers 62 (2): 362-375 (2013)), Wang et al. proposed a highly efficient and scalable TPA protocol and also a Zero Knowledge Public Auditing protocol which can prevent offline guessing attacks. However, in this paper, we point out several security weaknesses in Wang et al.'s protocols: first, we show that an attacker can arbitrarily modify the cloud data without being detected by the auditor in the integrity checking process, and the attacker can achieve this goal even without knowing the content of the cloud data or any verification metadata maintained by the cloud server; secondly, we show that the Zero Knowledge Public Auditing protocol cannot achieve its design goal, that is to prevent offline guessing attacks.
Introduction
Cloud computing offers different types of computational services to end users via computer networks [15] . It will become the next-generation information technology architecture due to its long list of advantages. Cloud storage [12] is one of the major services in cloud computing where user data are stored and maintained by cloud servers. It allows users to access their data via computer networks at anytime and from anywhere.
Despite the great benefits provided by cloud computing [14] , data security is a very important but challenging problem that must be solved [13] . One of the major concerns of data security is data integrity. Data integrity check can be done by periodically examining the data files stored on the cloud server if the data owner possesses some verification token (e.g. a hash digest of the data file). However, such an approach can be very expensive if the amount of data is huge. An interesting problem is to check data integrity remotely without the need of accessing the full copy of data stored on the cloud server.
Several techniques, such as Proof of Retrievability (POR) [2, 3] and Third Party Auditing (TPA) [1, 4, 7] , have been proposed to solve the above data integrity checking problem. POR is loosely speaking a kind of Proof of Knowledge (POK) [9] where the knowledge is the data file, while TPA allows any third party (or auditor) to perform the data integrity checking on behalf of the data owner just based on some public information (e.g. the data owner's public key).
In INFOCOM'10, Wang et al. [5] proposed a privacy-preserving public auditing protocol with high efficiency and scalability. In particular, the proposed protocol supports batch auditing, which means the third party auditor can concurrently handle simultaneous auditing of multiple tasks. In [4] , Wang et al. further extended their TPA protocol and proposed a new Zero Knowledge Public Auditing (ZKPA) protocol. The main security goal of the ZKPA protocol is to prevent offline guessing attack (or offline dictionary attack). It is worth noting that the early version of Wang et al.'s TPA protocol published in INFOCOM'10 is insecure: Xu et al. showed [10] that the cloud server can modify the user data without being caught by the auditor in the auditing process. However, Xu et al.'s attack cannot be applied to the TPA and ZKPA protocols in [4] .
In this paper, we show that there are several security weaknesses in Wang et al.'s TPA and ZKPA protocols [4] . First, we show that an attacker can arbitrarily modify the cloud data without being detected by the auditor in the integrity checking process of both protocols. We show that such an attack can be performed by different types of attackers under different scenarios, and in the weakest attacking setting, the attack can be launched even when the attacker doesn't know the content of the cloud data or any verification metadata which are maintained by the cloud server and required in the auditing process (the only information the attacker needs to know is how data are modified). In reality, such an attack can be launched by either external or internal attacks (e.g. a malicious programmer who doesn't have access to cloud user data can perform such an attack by embedding some software bugs in a computer program on the cloud server). We remark that it is possible to prevent such attacks by using some extra security mechanisms (e.g. access control) on the cloud server, but this is orthogonal to the security goals of an integrity checking scheme. The key point is that, if an integrity checking protocol is secure and robust, then once the user data stored on the cloud server have been modified, the auditor must be able to detect it in the integrity checking process. Secondly, we show that the ZKPA protocol cannot achieve its original security goal, that is, we can still launch an offline guessing attack against the protocol.
For the following part of this paper, we first review Wang et al.'s threat model and their TPA and ZKPA protocols. Then we show the security weaknesses in these two protocols in Sec. 3.
Review of Wang et al.'s Threat Model and Protocols

The Threat Model
We briefly review the threat model presented in [4] . The cloud data storage service involves three entities: the cloud server, the cloud user, and the third party auditor (TPA). The cloud user relies on the cloud server to store and maintain his/her huge amount of data. Since the user no longer keeps the data locally, it is of critical importance for the user to ensure that the data are correctly stored and maintained by the cloud server. In order avoid periodically data integrity verification, the user may resort to a TPA for checking the integrity of his/her outsourced data. However, the data must be kept secret from the TPA during the integrity checking process.
In [4] , it is assumed that data integrity threats can come from both internal and external attacks to the cloud server, such as malicious software bugs, hackers, network bugs, etc. Besides, the cloud server may also try to hide data corruption incidents to users for the sake of reputation. However, it is assumed that the TPA is reliable and independent, and would not collude with the cloud server.
Five security goals are listed in [4] : public auditability, storage correctness, privacy preserving, batch auditing, and lightweight. Among these goals, storage correctness and privacy preserving (i.e. the auditor cannot learn the content of the user data in the auditing process) are the most important security goals that must be achieved by a privacypreserving third party auditing protocol. For Zero Knowledge Public Auditing, there is an extra security goal, that is the protocol must be secure against offline guessing attacks.
Notations and Preliminaries
Before describing Wang et al.'s TPA and ZKPA protocols, we first introduce some notations and tools used by these protocols.
• F : the data file to be outsourced, denoted as a sequence of n blocks m 1 , ..., m n ∈ Z p for some large prime p.
• H(·), h(·): cryptographic hash functions.
Bilinear Map. Let G 1 , G 2 and G T be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g 1 and g be generators of G 1 and G 2 , respectively. A bilinear map is a map e :
Also, the map e must be efficiently computable and non-degenerate (i.e. e(g 1 , g) = 1).
The Third Party Auditing Protocol
Let (p, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e, g, H, h) be the system parameters as introduced above. Wang et al.'s privacy-preserving public auditing scheme works as follows:
Setup Phase:
KeyGen: The cloud user runs KeyGen to generate the public and secret keys. Specifically, the user generates a random verification and signing key pair (spk, ssk) of a digital signature scheme, a random x ← Z p , a random element u ← G 1 , and computes v ← g x . The user secret key is sk = (x, ssk) and the user public key is pk = (spk, v, g, u, e(u, v)).
SigGen: Given a data file F = (m 1 , ..., m n ), the user first chooses uniformly at random from Z p a unique identifier name for F . The user then computes authenticator σ i for each data block m i as σ
Denote the set of authenticators by φ = {σ i } 1≤i≤n . Then the user computes t = name SSig ssk (name) as the file tag for F , where SSig ssk (name) is the user's signature on name under the signing key ssk. It was assumed that the TPA knows the number of blocks n. The user then sends F along with the verification metadata (φ, t) to the cloud server and deletes them from local storage.
Audit Phase (Figure 1) :
VerifySig: The TPA first retrieves the file tag t and verifies the signature SSig ssk (name) by using spk. The TPA quits by emitting FALSE if the verification fails. Otherwise, the TPA recovers name.
Challenge: The TPA generates a challenge chal for the cloud server as follows: first pick a random c-element subset I = {s 1 , ..., s c } of set [1, n] , and then for each element i ∈ I, choose a random value ν i . The TPA sends chal = {(i, ν i )} i∈I to the cloud server.
GenProof: Upon receiving the challenge chal, the server generates a response to prove the data storage correctness. Specifically, the server chooses a random element r ← Z p , and calculates R = e(u, v) r ∈ G T . Let µ ′ denote the linear combination of sampled blocks specified in chal: µ ′ = i∈I v i m i . To blind µ ′ with r, the server computes µ = r + γµ ′ mod p, where γ = h(R) ∈ Z p . Meanwhile, the server also calculates an aggregated authenticator σ = i∈I σ νi i . It then sends (µ, σ, R) as the response to the TPA.
VerifyProof: Upon receiving the response (µ, σ, R) from the cloud server, the TPA validates the response by first computing γ = h(R) and then checking the following verification equation
R · e(σ γ , g)
The verification is successful if the equation holds. 
The Zero Knowledge Public Auditing Protocol
As pointed out by Wang et al. in [4] , the TPA protocol presented above is vulnerable to offline guessing attack. In order to prevent the attack, Wang et al. proposed the Zero Knowledge Public Auditing (ZKPA) protocol which is an extension of their TPA protocol.
The Setup phase is almost the same as in the TPA protocol, except that an additional generator g 1 ∈ G 1 is introduced in the user public key. In the Audit phase, upon receiving the challenge chal = {(i, ν i )} i∈I , the cloud server selects three random blind elements r m , r σ , ρ ∈ Z p , and calculates R = e(g 1 , g) rσ e(u, v) rm ∈ G T and γ = h(R) ∈ Z p . The cloud server then calculates µ ′ , σ according to the TPA protocol ( Fig. 1) , blinds both µ ′ and σ by computing µ = r m + γµ ′ modp, ς = r σ + γρmodp and Σ = σg ρ 1 . The cloud server then sends (ς, µ, Σ, R) as the response to the TPA. To verify it, the TPA computes γ = h(R) and then checks R · e(Σ γ , g)
(2)
3 Security Weaknesses in Wang et al.'s TPA and ZKPA Protocols
Storage Correctness
It is originally believed that Wang et al. TPA protocol can achieve all the five design goals given in Sec. 2.1. However, below we show that the protocol cannot achieve the important goal of Storage Correctness: an attacker can arbitrarily modify the data but at the same time fool the auditor to believe that the data are well maintained by the cloud server. We describe the attack in two different scenarios: in the first scenario, the attacker (e.g. a hacker or internal employee of the cloud server) can learn the content of the user data file F and modify it; while in the second scenario, the attacker can modify the file F but does not know its content (e.g. a malicious programmer plants a bug in the software running on the cloud server).
Scenario 1:
In this scenario, we assume the attacker (e.g. an employee of the cloud server) can access the user data file F . The attacker first makes a copy of the original file, and then modifies file blocks m i to m i * = m i + β i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
In the audit phase, after verifying the file tag t = name SSig ssk (name), the TPA sends a challenge {(i, ν i )} i∈I to the cloud server. Upon receiving the challenge, the cloud server would honestly compute R = e(u, v) r for a randomly chosen r and σ = i∈I σ νi i . However, as the data file has been modified, the cloud server would calculate
When the cloud server sends the response (µ * , σ, R) to the TPA, the attacker intercepts the message and generates a new response as follows:
The attacker then sends (μ, σ,R) to the TPA who will perform the verification according to Equation (1) . The verification will be successful as shown below.
R · e(σγ, g) = e(u, v) r e(u α , v)e((
Scenario 2:
In the second scenario, we assume the attacker (e.g. a malicious programmer who has planted a software bug on the cloud server) modifies the file block m i to m i * = m i + β i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. However, the attacker only knows β i (i.e. how the user data are modified) but not m i or m * i . In the audit phase, the TPA and the cloud server honestly execute the auditing protocol. That is, TPA sends a challenge {(i, ν i )} i∈I to the cloud server, and the cloud server sends back a response (µ * , R, σ) where R = e(u, v) r for a randomly chosen r, σ = i∈I σ νi i , and
The attacker intercepts the response (µ * , R, σ) from the cloud server to the TPA, and modifies µ * to µ = µ * − α where
It is easy to see that by doing such a simple modification, the attacker derives a correct response with respect to the original message blocks {m i } i∈I . In this way, the attacker can successfully fool the auditor to believe that the data file F is well preserved, while the real file on the cloud server has been modified.
Offline Guessing Attack
The TPA protocol presented in Fig. 1 is vulnerable to offline guessing attack [4] , since the TPA can always guess whether µ ′ ? =μ ′ , by checking e(σ, g)
whereμ ′ is constructed from random coefficients chosen by the TPA in the challenge and the guessed message
In order to prevent the offline guessing attack, in the ZKPA protocol, two additional blind elements r σ and ρ are introduced. It was believed that the ZKPA protocol can effectively prevent the offline guessing attack. However, below we show that the ZKPA protocol is still vulnerable to offline guessing attack. Given chal = {(i, ν i )} i∈I and the response (ς, µ, Σ, R), our attack works as follows:
1. for the guessed message {m i } s1≤i≤sc , computeμ ′ = Σ i∈I ν imi andr m = µ − γμ ′ modp;
2. compute e(g 1 , g)r σ = R/e(u, v)r m ;
3. compute e(g 1 , g)ρ = (e(g, g) ς /e(g 1 , g)r σ ) γ −1 and e(σ, g) = e(Σ, g)/e(g 1 , g)ρ;
4. check the equation e(σ, g)
If the equation holds, then output the guessed message {m i } s1≤i≤sc ; otherwise, go to step (1) for another guess.
The above attack essentially shows that the attacker can successfully remove the additional blind elements introduced in the ZKPA protocol and use equation (3) to locate the message {m i } s1≤i≤sc .
Conclusion
In this paper, we revisited a privacy-preserving third party auditing (TPA) cloud storage integrity checking protocol and its extended version for zero knowledge public auditing (ZKPA). We showed several security weaknesses in these protocols. It is still an open problem to design a ZKPA protocol that can prevent offline guessing attacks, and we leave it as our future work.
